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We examine the sources and processes of institutional change in one important aspect of EU politics—
the legislative procedure of codecision and show how interstitial change of institutions emerges 
between formal Treaty revisions and under specific conditions may be formalized in subsequent 
formal Treaty reforms. We develop two related models of Treaty change. First, in a ‘simple’ model, 
we argue that informal rules will be formalized in the Treaty text where all member states are in 
agreement, and will be rolled back when all member states oppose them; otherwise they will continue 
in existence at the informal level. Second, in a more complex framework, we argue that actors who 
have effective veto powers in a related arena may make credible threats that allow them to press 
member states into formalizing informal rules, provided that member states are not unanimously 
opposed to this formalization. We empirically assess our claims in the light of several instances of 
informal rules applied in the codecision procedure. 
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Introduction
* 
What are the sources of change in institutions? Are such changes to be accounted for by exogenous 
events or shocks, or are they driven by endogenous processes or a combination of both? This question 
is at the heart of important debates in international relations theory, comparative politics and in the 
study of the European Union. Recently, both international relations, comparative politics and EU 
studies have seen the advent of new forms of institutional analysis, most notably game theoretic 
techniques of institutional modelling that have been borrowed from the study of American politics. 
However, as we argue in this paper, these new approaches may systematically discount the extent to 
which change can—and does—occur in complex institutional systems such as the EU between formal 
treaty revisions, and, how change occurs endogenously once formal institutions have been established. 
This article sets out to examine the sources and processes of institutional change in one important 
aspect of EU politics—the legislative procedure of codecision and show how interstitial change of 
institutions emerges between formal Treaty revisions and under which specific conditions they are 
formalized in subsequent formal Treaty reforms. The game-theoretic analysis of institutions suggest 
that institutions are the product of conscious choice by a small group of actors. Thus, in the European 
context, member states have complete control of institutions and shape them off-stage such that they 
produce exactly the desired outcomes. By relaxing one, manifestly unrealistic assumption of current 
game theoretic accounts of EU politics, that the member states are capable of crafting complete 
contracts that will cover all contingencies—one can show that there are predictable circumstances 
under which the member states will not be ‘masters of the Treaty’ but that institutional changes may 
emerge after the setting up of formal higher order institutional rules which subsequently may be 
accepted or rejected in a formal revision of the treaties. Under the unanimity rule governing Treaty 
change, member states may have difficulty in overturning existing practices. 
Our argument has important implications not only for EU politics, but also for all types of 
institutions. It shows the limits of current game theoretic approaches to the analysis of international 
and national institutions, and points to the possibility of an alternative research programme, that would 
analyze more closely the relationship between the forces governing the day-to-day politics of 
institutions (informal bargaining processes) and those governing choice over the macro-institutional 
frameworks that shape behaviour. In earlier work,
1 we have argued that bargaining over the 
implementation of political procedures such as codecision may lead to the interstitial creation of 
informal institutions, and that these informal institutions may in turn affect future rounds of Treaty 
change. This article specifies more precisely how informal institutional changes may affect future 
rounds of Treaty bargaining. 
It starts by providing an outline of the relationship between informal institutional change and 
formal institutional revision in the European Union. Next, it goes on to lay out two related models of 
Treaty Change. First, in a ‘simple’ model, the article argues that the combination of (a) a condition of 
an incomplete contract that would not cover all possible contingencies will lead to informal rules 
guiding the day-to-day application of the contract, and (b) the decision rules governing formal 
revision, will mean that it will sometimes be impossible for member states to reverse these informal 
institutional changes, and that indeed under certain circumstances they may wish to incorporate them 
into the treaty. Second, in a more complex model, the article hypothesizes that actors who are the 
beneficiaries of the informal rules with veto powers in related arenas and/or in an alliance with a 
formal veto-player may make credible threats that allow them to press member states into formalizing 
informal rules, provided that member states are not unanimously opposed to this formalization. It 
                                                      
*   We would like to thank the Swedish Institute for European Policy Research in Stockholm for the generous funding of our 
research. 
1   Farrell and Heritiér, 2003. Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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derives some initial hypotheses from these theoretical considerations. Next, it sets out an initial 
‘plausibility probe’ of these hypotheses, examining how well it describes three recent cases of the 
formalization of an informal institutional rule. It concludes by considering the more general 
circumstances under which informal institutional change may have long lasting consequences for the 
shape of EU politics—and for the development of institutions more generally. 
Institutional Change in the European Union 
Two prominent perspectives dominate the study of EU politics. Scholars who believe that the 
integration process is driven by the choices of member states, focus on Intergovernmental Conferences 
(IGCs) as the key moments of institutional change, arguing that IGCs (and member state choice) is the 
fundamental engine of integration. Scholars who argue that the Commission, European Parliament and 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) play an important role in determining institutional choice, tend 
instead to focus on the everyday politics of the EU as the arena within which institutional change 
occurs. While some scholars clearly recognize that these two arenas of institutional choice—IGCs and 
everyday politics—are interconnected, there are few attempts to theorize these connections, and to 
produce hypotheses. This reflects a more general theoretical lacuna in the study of international 
institutions, and indeed of institutions more generally. 
This article proposes that everyday politics and IGCs are indeed linked, and that the connection 
travels in both directions. Not only may formal institutional changes that are agreed at IGCs affect 
how everyday politics is carried out in future and lead to interstitial changes of institutions, but the 
latter may also affect future rounds of formal institutional creation. In order to test this claim, it is 
necessary to identify the different political processes through which institutional change occurs in both arenas. 
First, one may examine decision making over constitutional change to the European Treaty texts. 
Since the Single European Act of 1987, the European Union has seen a new IGCs every few years, in 
which changes to the Treaty texts are negotiated. In a first analytical step the article claims that this 
process of institutional choice is dominated by the member states. The role other main organizational 
actors in the EU—the European Parliament and the European Commission which are consulted in the 
process– also plays an important indirect agenda setting role for IGCs (and, in a context of iterated 
exchange, may have some implicit bargaining weight), which is developed in a second analytical step. 
Indeed, the Commission has historically acted as an important interlocutor in the bargaining process 
among member states.
2 However, the final choice rests with the member states—each member state 
has a veto over future Treaty changes. Thus, changes to the fundamental constitutional texts of the EU 
require unanimity among the member states if they are to be carried. 
Second, the article examines the ‘everyday politics’ that takes place in the EU between rounds of 
constitutional negotiation. As we have argued in previous work,
3 the provisions of the Treaty texts that 
have been negotiated in past IGCs—which have properties of an incomplete contract—serve as a 
starting point for new negotiations and bargains among the main organizational actors within the EU 
legislative process over competences. The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission each 
seek to maximize their legislative competences through bargaining over how ambiguities in the Treaty 
texts ought to be interpreted and applied to the legislative process. Each organizational actor typically 
seeks to maximize its competences through such bargaining. The respective bargaining strengths of 
the actors involved will depend on the options given by the formal texts themselves, and the actors’ 
fall-back positions in the case of a failure of the bargaining process, as affected by their time horizons, 
and their particular sensitivity to outcomes. Given these factors, the predominance of the member 
states (as represented by the Council) is by no means a given—in many circumstances, other actors 
                                                      
2   Scholars disagree on the extent to which the Commission may have an independent influence on member state choice in IGCs. 
3   Farrell and Héritier, 2003. Codecision and Institutional Change 
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such as the Parliament, will have superior bargaining strength.
4 Over time, given ambiguity of treaty 
provisions, these processes may lead to the creation of informal, and sometimes quasi-formal 
institutions that instantiate these differences in bargaining power, and provide actors with a reasonable 
degree of certainty when facing complex situations in the future. Thus, periods of everyday politics 
between Treaty changes will involve the creation of informal institutions that structure actors relations 
within the legislative process. These informal institutions may accommodate existing formal rules by 
specifying or complementing them. However, they may also transform them in the sense of becoming 
competing institutional rules shifting the relative decision-making weight of the involved actors. It is 
the latter that this article concentrates on. 
How do these twin processes of institutional change—formal choice over institutions in IGCs, and 
informal bargaining in everyday legislative politics between IGCs—affect each other? As mentioned, 
scholars typically concentrate on the putatively determinate effects of formal institutions for everyday 
politics. Thus, for example, Garrett and Tsebelis contend that the Treaties will be ‘the basis for all 
actors’ behaviour,’
5 with the implication that informal institutions, to the extent that they exist at all, 
are merely the contingent by-product of formal Treaty texts. In contrast, we argue that there is an 
iterated relationship between formal and informal institutions. Formal institutional changes at time t 
(an IGC) give rise to bargaining at time t+1 (everyday politics) about how these changes can be 
implemented, which in turn give rise to informal institutions that may affect negotiations in a new IGC 
at time t+2 and lead to revised formal rules.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
In order to show that previous rounds of informal institutionalization may affect bargaining in IGCs 
we employ three major assumptions. First, we assume that the meta-institutions governing choice 
count.
6 In particular, we assume that the unanimity requirement fundamentally constrains member 
state choice over new constitutional changes at IGCs. In order to successfully change the Treaty texts, 
it is necessary to persuade all member states that this change is necessary. 
Second,
7 we assume that the EU Treaties are not complete contracts, rather that they contain 
provisions that are ambiguous. In other words, when member states negotiate changes to the Treaty 
texts ex ante, they cannot be certain of how these changes will be implemented ex post. There may be 
inconsistencies or ambiguities within the contracts as they are negotiated by actors with diverse 
preferences with bounded rationality under serious time constraints.
8 Furthermore, even when actors 
are perfectly rational, there are likely to be limits to their foresight—they will be unable fully to fully 
anticipate ex ante how the institutions that they negotiate may be applied in novel and unanticipated 
circumstances ex post. Thus, even where member states negotiate institutions that seek to ‘control’ 
organizational actors such as the Commission and Parliament through appropriate mechanisms, they 
will be unable to do so perfectly—the contracts that they create will be incomplete, and vulnerable to 
reinterpretation ex post in circumstances that were not initially foreseen. It is precisely because of the 
member states’ inability to negotiate complete contracts that bargaining may arise over the practical 
interpretation of Treaty texts, i.e. conflict over competences that give rise in turn to informal 
institutions.
9 
                                                      
4   Farrell and Héritier 2003, although see also Farrell and Héritier 2004. 
5   Garrett and Tsebelis, p. 356. 
6   And that they count in many of the same ways that one-shot game theorists presume they do. 
7   And in contrast to most scholars who use one-shot games to model EU institutions. 
8   There is ample anecdotal evidence to suggest that IGCs – where the major concessions are often made only at the last 
possible moment – very often produce ambiguous, or even partly incoherent texts. 
9   Farrell and Héritier, 2003. Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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Finally, we assume that actors are interested in maximizing their own influence on policy outcomes 
through increasing their effective competences. 
These assumptions, when taken together, lead to two important conclusions. First, in every instance 
of IGC negotiation except the negotiation of the initial Treaty of Rome, member states will be faced 
with an existing panoply of institutions that does not precisely match their preferences. Each IGC 
gives rise to formal institutional changes, which in turn give rise to bargaining among legislative 
actors over ambiguous higher order institutional rules that produce informal institutional rules that 
instantiate the results of these episodes of bargaining. At any point in time, these informal institutions 
mean that the existing Treaty texts may be interpreted and applied in a manner that deviates 
substantially from member state preferences. Had member states known ex ante how the rules that 
they created were going to be applied ex post, they might very well have chosen a different set of rules. 
However, and this is the second conclusion, member states are fundamentally constrained in their 
ability to correct previous institutional changes that have had consequences that were unanticipated 
ex-ante, so that these institutions better reflect their ex-post preferences. At any given IGC, many 
member states may wish to change institutions that were created in previous IGCs, and that have been 
interpreted in unexpected (and unwanted) ways. However, the unanimity rule presents a fundamental 
limit to their ability to make such changes—because the agreement of all member states is required, it 
may prove impossible to create the necessary consensus for change, even if a majority of member 
states favour it. In situations where informal institutional change has pushed the integration process 
further than most member states want it to go, or where the Commission or Parliament have accrued 
more power than the member states would like them to have accrued, change will only be possible if 
the most pro-integration member state (or, as appropriate, the member state that most favours the 
Commission or Parliament) agrees to it. The unanimity rule is two-edged—even as it sometimes 
brakes the ambitions of pro-integrationist member states (who would prefer institutional changes 
increasing the power of Commission or Parliament), it equally may hinder states who wish to roll back 
the powers of Commission or Parliament, when these powers have developed in unexpected ways 
through informal institutional change. 
Thus, we argue—in a first step—that the inability of member states to create complete contracts ex 
ante, combined with the restrictions that unanimity imposes on member states’ ability appropriately to 
revise contracts ex-post will affect the extent to which informal institutions may survive—even when a 
majority of member states oppose them. Under our, admittedly simplified argument, there are three 
possible constellations of member state preferences regarding a given informal institution that has 
arisen through bargaining in everyday politics. First, all member states may be in agreement that the 
survival of a particular informal institution is not in their interests. Second, all member states may be 
in agreement that the survival of a particular informal institution is in their interests. Finally, member 
states may disagree on whether the survival of a particular informal institution is in their interests, 
under unanimity, the obdurate dissent of one member state from the majority position is enough to 
prevent change. Each of these constellations of preference, in combination with the unanimity rule of 
decision-making, will lead to determinate outcomes, as shown in the hypotheses below. 
Hypothesis One: When all member states agree that the survival of a particular informal institution 
is not in their interests, they will introduce formal institutional changes that are intended to undercut 
the relevant informal institution. 
When all member states are unanimous that the survival of a particular informal institutional 
change disadvantages them, then—assuming that there is a clearly superior alternative—they may 
introduce appropriate formal institutional changes at the next IGC, that eliminate the relevant 
loophole, and thus render the informal institution moot. The requirements for this action are relatively 
stringent—all member states must be in agreement that the continuation of a particular informal 
institution goes against their interests. Nonetheless, it presents a clear—and important—limit on the 
ability of Commission and Parliament to use informal institutionalization as a means of accruing power.  Codecision and Institutional Change 
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Hypothesis Two: When all member states agree that the survival of a particular informal institution 
is in their interests, they will not try to undercut it; indeed they will seek to strengthen it through 
providing formal supports in subsequent changes to the Treaty. 
One might reasonably contend that there are many circumstances where member states will be in 
agreement that the continuation of an informal institution is to their advantage or at least is better than 
the other obvious alternatives, but see no need for further formal developments. Still, there is good 
reason to believe that where member states are convinced of the advantages of an informal institution, 
they will seek to build on it through formalization. First, as Carey (2000) argues, ‘parchment’ may 
very substantially increase the coordination effect of institutions, allowing actors to establish mutual 
expectations about behaviour more easily than with many informal institutions. Thus, member states 
will very often wish to ‘cement’ informal institutions that they consider to work to their advantage 
through building them into the formal institutional framework of the Treaty. Second, even where 
member states do not wish to formalize informal institutions in order to preserve some degree of 
flexibility, they may wish to use existing informal institutions as an initial starting point for future 
trajectories of formal institutional change, which do not so much formalize the institutions in question, 
as build ancillary formal institutions that have an existing set of informal institutions as their sine qua 
non and necessary foundation. 
Hypothesis Three: When member states are in disagreement over whether the survival of a 
particular informal institution is in their interests, they will not be able to reach the necessary 
consensus either to undercut it, or to formalize it. Accordingly, they will leave it alone. 
Finally, hypothesis three predicts that where member states are unable to agree over whether the 
continuation of an informal institution is in their interests, they will be stalemated. Because of the 
unanimity rule, neither those who disfavour the informal institution and would like to undermine it or 
those who favour the institution and would perhaps like to formalize it, may introduce Treaty changes. 
Thus, under these circumstances, informal institutions will persist without any interference, positive or 
negative, from member states at the IGC. Given the stringent conditions required to achieve 
unanimity, this is probably by far the most common of the three possible constellations when 
politically interesting issues are at stake. 
Thus, in a first analytical step, the combination of (a) the inability of member states to create 
complete contracts, (b) the unanimity rule that applies at IGCs, and (c) actors wish to increase their 
own institutional power, mean that Treaty texts may have unexpected results, such as the creation of 
informal institutions, and that member states will have difficulty in reversing these results. Under our 
argument, specific constellations of member state interests will be associated with specific outcomes 
in terms of the undermining, formalization or survival of informal institutions at the IGC stage.  
In a second analytical step a more complicated model is presented, which includes the possibility 
that other actors than the formal decision-makers in a treaty change can affect such a change. How is 
this possible? In the European Union, as in other complex setting, actors interact across a variety of 
arenas of policy making and institutional design. This means that—under specific circumstances—
actors who are not involved directly in Treaty negotiations can seek to link outcomes in these 
negotiations to outcomes in other arenas where they are directly involved, thus leveraging their 
bargaining power in the arena in which they are not formally involved to press for Treaty changes.  
This model starts from the same basic assumptions as in the ‘simple’ model—that is, that the 
unanimity rule counts, and that member states (or other actors) cannot draft complete contracts. 
However, it is complicated by adding the assumption that other arenas of policymaking and 
institutional design exist, perhaps creating ‘nested games’ (Tsebelis 1990); but nested games in which 
the outcomes are institutions and policies. Actors will be able to link these arenas together under two 
conditions. First, it is necessary that interested actors who are not veto players in the formal process of 
Treaty negotiation do have veto power in a second arena of policymaking or institutional change, and 
can thus make credible threats. By ‘interested’ actors, we mean actors who have clear preferences over Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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the various possible Treaty outcomes (in this case the formalization of an informal rule favourable to 
these actors) which diverge from those of the member states, and who thus have an incentive to make 
credible threats if they are able to do so. Second, it is necessary that the member states, the actors who 
are directly responsible for Treaty reform are vulnerable to credible threats that are made in the second 
arena. Thus, they have an incentive to respond to these threats, by responding to the demands of the 
relevant actors without a formal role in Treaty revision. In our case member states would be 
vulnerable to such threats because they need a unanimous vote to bring a treaty change. 
There is an obvious limitation to the ability of outside actors to make credible threats to member 
states, which flows from some of our arguments in the ‘simple’ model. Outside actors, even if they 
have veto power in a different arena, will only be able to make credible threats where the member 
states have divergent preferences. Where member states have unanimous preferences—i.e. they are all 
vigorously opposed to a proposed institutional change—they will be able successfully to resist 
pressure because they can make a credible counter-threat—to eliminate the veto powers of the outside 
actors in question through appropriate Treaty revisions. 
Thus, our more complex model will make the same predictions as our simple model in those areas 
where member states have unanimous preferences. Where it differs from the simple model is in those 
situations where member states have divergent  preferences. Rather than simply predicting that 
informal institutions will persist, it predicts that under specific conditions, outside actors might well 
succeed in pressing member states to formalize an informal institution from which those actors benefit.  
Thus Hypothesis Four is an alternative to Hypothesis Three. 
Hypothesis Four: Outside actors may successfully press for Treaty change that formalizes informal 
rules where (a) they have the power to make credible threats in other linked arenas, (b) where the 
actors deciding over Treaty change (the member states) are vulnerable (due to unanimity rule) to those 
threats, and (c) the member states have divergent rather than unanimous preferences.  
Methodology 








Standards falsification  
H1  All member states yes; 
Stated positions 
Formalization of informal 
rule; new formal rule  
No formalization of 
informal rule 
H2  All member states no; 
Stated positions 
No formalization of informal 
rule; informal rule dropped 
Formalization of 
informal rule 
H3  Member states disagree; 
Stated positions  Informal rule remains valid  Informal rule dropped 
H4  Arena linkage; Stated 
positions  Informal rule formalized  Informal rule not 
formalized 
In order to empirically explore the indicators of the independent and dependent variables we use 
the following data sources: Information has been collected in half-structured, intensive interviews 
with the concerned formal players from the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. 
Moreover, archival documents on the negotiation processes of the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, 
internal documents of the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission have 
been systematically analyzed.  
In order to conduct an initial plausibility probe of our four hypotheses we choose the following 
cases. To empirically assess Hypotheses One and Two (member states unanimously in favour or 
against formalization) we choose a case with unanimous support for the informal rule having emerged 
under codecision, i.e. the formalization of early agreement (Hypothesis one) and compare it to the Codecision and Institutional Change 
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outcome of a case with a unanimous rejection of an informal rule by member states (Hypothesis two), 
i.e. the Ken Collins amendment. To probe the plausibility of Hypothesis three and four (‘Member 
states disagree’) we investigate the case of the abolishing of the third reading. We stress that we do 
not undertake to test our hypotheses in a rigorous fashion which would require a relatively large n of cases. 
Case one: The Institutionalization of the ‘early agreements’ provision  
The empirical exploration of the case of the formal institutionalization of the early agreement relates 
to Hypothesis One stating that if all member states favour an informal rule, it will be formalized.  
The introduction of the codecision procedure or procedure under Art. 189 A, as it was expressly 
called in the Maastricht Treaty
10 led to a series of institutional battles between the European 
Parliament, and the Council over how codecision should be implemented.
11 Ambiguities in the Treaty 
text led Parliament and Council to adopt differing interpretations. While the Parliament maintained 
that the codecision procedure effectively gave it equality with Council in the process of debating and 
deciding legislation, the Council initially maintained that it did not need to bargain with the 
Parliament, and would merely indicate those pieces of legislation that it was prepared to accept or 
reject, on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis (Corbett et al 2000). Neither side was initially prepared to back 
down—the Parliament went so far as to threaten to block or slow legislation in order to increase its 
negotiating power. After a series of hard-fought legislative battles, the Council gradually came to 
accept that it did indeed need to negotiate with the Parliament over legislative items that came under 
the codecision procedure. COREPER and Council had to recognize that Parliament had the role of a 
copartner in legislation. The confidence building really started with the introduction of the informal 
trialogues. The latter enabled both sides to speak more frankly, and to explain more in detail what the 
underlying reasons are for the positions that they adopted.
12 
In the words of an official from the European Parliament,  
this institutional innovation has … served to generate a variety of procedural norms and shared 
beliefs about how the parties should behave which can only be described as ‘rules of engagement.’ 
By the end of the Maastricht era, they had become so self-evident that no one contested them.
13 
This in turn gave rise to a series of informal institutions, which instantiated the expectations of both 
Council and Parliament over how negotiations should proceed, and reduced transaction costs by 
creating a set of shared expectations among all actors in the legislative process regarding appropriate 
procedures. 
The most important of these institutions involved the process of early agreements resulting from 
‘trialogues’(sometimes called ‘trilogues’).
14 Early agreements rapidly became perceived as essential, 
not only by the European Parliament, but also by important officials within the Council, who directly 
represented member states. Clearly, they represented an important concession to the European 
Parliament—they allowed the Parliament to exert an influence on legislation that it would not 
otherwise have had. Equally clearly, in a world where the Parliament was willing and able to block 
legislation, the Council had a strong interest in ensuring that discussions with Parliament began at an 
early stage, and were conducted reasonably smoothly. This was especially so as the Council was 
relatively understaffed, and had difficulty in dealing with a large volume of contentious legislation. 
                                                      
10  Part of the compromise among governments was to avoid calling the new provisions ‘codecision procedure’, in particular 
to meet the concerns of the UK government.  
11  The informal institutional changes described in this section are discussed at greater length in Farrell and Héritier, 2003. 
12  Interview with Council Official B. 
13  Shackleton, 2000. 
14  See Shackleton, 2000. Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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Trialogues and the ensuing early agreements after first reading provided the Council with an important 
means of limiting its own workload to manageable proportions. 
As discussions began about the next round of Treaty changes after Maastricht, it was the 
Parliament which in its resolutions about codecision 
15 proposed to formally simplify the procedure 
under Art. 189A by allowing agreement after the first reading when there is an agreement between the 
Council and the Parliament.
16 The Council Secretariat, too, proposed an effective extension of the 
trialogue procedures, so that it would cover earlier parts of the codecision process. The Parliament 
with its two representatives proposed it again in the Reflection Group 
17 which had been formed to 
prepare the negotiations of foreign ministers in the IGC. Taking part in the so-called Westendorp 
Group ‘for the first time allowed the EP to play a formal co-agenda setting role’ (Devuyst 1998:618).
18 
The Commission did not support this proposal of coming to an agreement at first reading. However, 
the Irish presidency included the provision proposing that the Council had the possibility to approve 
the text amended by the Parliament at first reading, but that the Council could only unanimously adopt 
a modified Commission proposal. The Dutch presidency proposed the same provision as the Irish 
presidency tabling a proposal under which the Council could adopt an act at first reading—provided 
that it decided on the basis of unanimity if the Commission had given a negative opinion. In the course 
of the negotiations a consensus emerged among all member states to formalize the possibility of 
accepting an act after the first reading. The Amsterdam Treaty issued in August 1997 in Art. 251A 
(old 189A) included the provision that it is now possible to adopt a text at first reading if the 
Parliament does not propose any amendments or if the Council agrees with the Parliament’s first 
reading amendments. The treaty does not explicitly mention the obligation for the Council to vote at 
unanimity on the amendments with which the Commission did not agree. ‘The Council, acting by 
qualified majority, after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament, if it approves all the 
amendments contained in the European Parliament’s opinion, may adopt the proposed act thus 
amended’.
19 This formulation is different from the wording of the adoption at second reading which 
provides that the Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which the Commission has 
delivered a negative opinion.  
As a result, the Treaty of Amsterdam has formalized the informal practice that had emerged during 
the application of Art. 189A TEU and allows the Council and the Parliament to begin negotiating and 
conclude negotiations at a much earlier stage. Under our argument, the early agreements and 
subsequently the formalized adoption at first reading can clearly be seen as an unexpected informal 
institutional innovation—they were in no sense anticipated in the Maastricht provisions that 
introduced the codecision procedure. However, once they had been introduced, they rapidly proved 
                                                      
15  Committee on Institutional Affairs, Bourlanges/Martin report adopted on 17th May 1995, Dury/Maij-Weggen Report 
adopted 13 March 1996. 
16  Whereas the Commission in its position for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty did not propose it (Moravscik and 
Nicolaidis 1999). 
17  The Reflection group consisted of representatives of each member state, two representatives of the Parliament and one 
representative of the Commission. 
18  Contrary to 1990 when the Parliament had reassembled the national parliaments of member states in an Assizes in order 
to muster support for the introduction of codecision in the Maastricht Treaty, the Parliament did not organize an Assize to 
prepare the negotiations for the revision of the Maastricht Treaty. Although the President of the Parliament, Klaus 
Haensch, had called on national parliaments to hold another conference of parliaments, only the Belgian parliament 
supported the initiative. According to Judge (1995) this was mainly due to the (mistaken) impression in the public from 
the final declaration of the Rome Assizes in ....that the national parliaments would relinquish further powers without 
demanding additional rights of control over their governments. However, the two representatives of the Parliament in the 
reflection group met the representatives of each parliament in order to collect information regarding their positions with 
respect to the negotiations (EP Etat de la reflection des parlements nationaux sur la IGC de 1996, 14.2.1996) 
19  This ambiguity has given rise to some legal dispute. While some argued that the Commission has lost ist possibility to 
force Council to unanimity, the converging view is that the obligation for the Council to decide on the basis of unanimity 
is maintained for the first reading. Codecision and Institutional Change 
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essential to the Parliament and the Council—the organization that seeks to implement the preferences 
of member states over items of legislation. Given the potential veto power of the Parliament over 
important items of legislation, the Council, and the member states had some considerable incentive to 
reach an appropriate modus operandi. Early agreements provided just this, and demonstrably eased 
transaction costs—thus, member states were easily able to reach consensus on further formal Treaty 
reforms that were intended to extend informal trialogues to other parts of the legislative process. Thus, 
the empirical evidence of the early agreement case supports our first claim that if all member states 
agree to formalize an informal rule, this formalization will happen. 
Case two: ‘The Ken Collins Amendment’ 
Case two is relevant to Hypothesis Two which argues that if all member-states are in favour of the 
rejection of an informal rule, the informal rule will not be formalized or formally outruled. In the 
application of the conciliation provision of the Maastricht Treaty the long-time chair of the 
Environment Committee, Ken Collins, in the negotiation of environmental legislation repeatedly 
introduced new amendments at the stage of conciliation, ‘to use them as bargaining chips or to change 
the dimensionality of negotiations. Collins pointed out there was nothing in the Treaty to prevent this 
interpretation of the rules’ (Hix 2002:276). In the negotiation of the revision of the Maastricht Treaty 
the drafts submitted to the Conciliation committee were an object of intensive discussion. Member 
states were unanimous in trying to fill this loophole and to prevent this exercise of discretion by 
members of Parliament by specifying the provisions governing the conciliation procedure. Several 
possibilities were discussed. ‘By specifying that conciliation negotiations are restricted to the EP and 
Council positions at second reading, the governments restricted any further EP interpretation of the 
rules to its advantage on this issue’ (Hix 2002:276).  
Thus the second case—the formalization of the Ken Collins amendment—supports our second 
claim arguing that if member states agree to abolish an informal rule, they will proceed to do so. In 
this particular case by specifying the formal rules the application of the informal rule (introduction of 
new amendments during the conciliation procedure) became impossible. 
Case three: The Abolishing of the Third Reading 
Case three, in a first step, addresses Hypothesis Three which claims that if member states have diverse 
preferences, an informal rule will be maintained and no formal change will be brought about. The 
empirical case we investigate to probe the plausibility of this claim is the discussion around the 
abolishing of the third reading. The provision of the Maastricht Treaty that allowed the Council to 
reintroduce its common position in the case of a failure of the conciliation procedure unless an 
absolute majority of the Parliament could be mustered to reject it, was a thorn in the Parliament’s flesh 
because it felt that this introduced a bias in the relative power of the Council and the Parliament in the 
codecision procedure. It therefore early on issued a new internal rule regarding the third reading to the 
effect that: 
1. Where no agreement is reached on a joint text within the Conciliation Committee, the President 
((of the EP)) shall invite the Commission to withdraw its proposal, and invite the Council not to 
adopt under any circumstances a position pursuant to Art 189b(6) of the EC Treaty. Should the 
Council nonetheless confirm its common position, the President of the Council shall be invited to 
justify the decision before the Parliament in plenary sitting. The matter shall automatically be 
placed on the agenda of the last part-session to fall within six or, if extended, eight weeks of the 
confirmation by the Council... 3. No amendments shall be tabled to the Council text. 4. The 
Council text as a whole shall be the subject of a single vote. Parliament shall vote on a motion to 
reject the Council text. If this motion receives the votes of a majority of the competent Members of 
the Parliament, the ((EP)) President shall declare the proposed act not adopted. (Internal Rule of 
the EP, quoted after Hix 2002:273) Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier 
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When the Council for the first time reintroduced its common position, the Parliament proceeded to 
action. In an open conflict with the Council
20 the Parliament rejected in 1994 a proposal which the 
Council had reintroduced after a failed conciliation procedure, the proposal for a directive on voice 
telephony. Following the vote on the Open Telephony Directive the Council did not reintroduce its 
common position anymore but came to a compromise with the Parliament during the conciliation 
procedure (Hix 2002:275). 
In the course of the preparation of the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty the Parliament 
proposed in its position to drop the third reading altogether. The Commission in its position supported 
the abolishing of the third reading as well. Member states, by contrast, had mixed preferences. As it 
emerged under the negotiations led by the Italian, and the Irish Presidencies, Germany, Italy and 
Greece proposed the abolition of the third reading, whereas a majority insisted on keeping it.  
These divergent preferences of member states according to our hypothesis would lead to the 
maintaining of the existing informal rule, i.e. the Parliament’s practice of voting down any common 
position reintroduced by the Council after the failure of the conciliation process and the subsistence of 
the Maastricht formal provision. This, however, is not what happened. Rather at the end of the 
negotiations the member states accepted the abolition of the third reading. Hence, our third claim is 
disconfirmed. 
How can one account for the fact that—in spite of a majority of member states being opposed to 
the elimination of the third reading—member states in the end agreed to de facto formalize the 
informal rule which had been applied by the Parliament to keep the Council from using its right of 
reintroducing its common position?  
This question leads us to our fourth hypothesis on linked arenas claiming that an actor without a 
formal say in one arena A (i.e. Treaty revision) may use pressure by establishing a link to its formal 
veto power in linked arena B (i.e. legislation, or enlargement in the case of the Parliament) in order to 
achieve its institutional objectives in arena A. This is exactly what happened in the case of the 
abolishing of the third reading in the Amsterdam Treaty. The Parliament threatened that if the 
procedure were not be amended as it had proposed, it would—under the old procedure—continue to 
reject any common position so confirmed.  
Thus, case three shows that absence of unanimity of member states does not necessarily lead to the 
maintaining of the informal rule, but that—given divergent preferences of member states- member 
states are susceptible to pressure from other actors. An actor which gains from an informal rule, but 
does not have a formal role in treaty revisions, can exert pressure on others to formalize this rule by 
using its veto power in other, linked, arenas, in which it plays a role.  
Conclusions 
This article sets out initial arguments about the relationship between informal and formal institutions, 
focusing on the question of when informal institutions are likely to lead to formal institutional change, 
and when not. Our argument presents an alternative to a dominant strain in the existing literature on 
EU institutions, which posits that they are the product of member state choice, and will act to constrain 
organizational actors such as Parliament and Commission in an effective fashion. Our argument 
provides the beginnings of a useful alternative approach, that would examine how the intersection 
between rules of choice and incompleteness of contracts leads to change over time, and, more 
specifically, affects the ways in which informal institutional change may have formal consequences. 
We have argued that an informal rule will be formalized if member states in the Treaty revision 
unanimously support the formalization. If they unanimously reject the informal rule, it will be 
                                                      
20  Concerning the right of controlling the implementation power of the Commission. Codecision and Institutional Change 
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removed. These two claims are borne out by preliminary explorations of empirical cases. The third 
claim is that if member states have divergent preferences, the informal rule should be upheld. The 
empirical case studies do not support this claim, but suggest the importance additional factors as 
formulated in our fourth hypotheses. This suggests that in cases where the member states have diverse 
preferences, the beneficiary of the informal rule, even when it is not present at the formal treaty 
revision, will indirectly be able to exert pressure on member states by establishing a link to another 
arena where she has a formal say, or by mustering the support of another veto-player. This more 
complex framework, as we present it, is still quite preliminary—much more work is needed to specify 
the precise conditions under which outside actors will, or will not be able to make credible threats. 
Nonetheless, together with the more simple model, it provides strong reason to believe that 
institutional change is not solely a function of member state preferences, even at IGCs, and is driven 
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